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Abstract
People can perceive misfortunes as caused by previous bad deeds (immanent justice reasoning) or resulting in ultimate
compensation (ultimate justice reasoning). Across two studies, we investigated the relation between these types of justice
reasoning and identified the processes (perceptions of deservingness) that underlie them for both others (Study 1) and the
self (Study 2). Study 1 demonstrated that observers engaged in more ultimate (vs. immanent) justice reasoning for a ‘‘good’’
victim and greater immanent (vs. ultimate) justice reasoning for a ‘‘bad’’ victim. In Study 2, participants’ construals of their
bad breaks varied as a function of their self-worth, with greater ultimate (immanent) justice reasoning for participants with
higher (lower) self-esteem. Across both studies, perceived deservingness of bad breaks or perceived deservingness of
ultimate compensation mediated immanent and ultimate justice reasoning respectively.
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Introduction
A long history of research into the psychology of justice and
deservingness has demonstrated that people are motivated to make
sense of and find meaning in their own and others’ experiences of
suffering and misfortune [1], [2], [3], and they do so in a variety of
ways [4], [5], [6]. For example, on the one hand, people may
attempt to perceive a ‘‘silver lining’’ in someone’s undeserved
suffering by adopting the belief that although a victim is currently
suffering, she will ultimately be compensated for her misfortune
[3]. In other words, through ultimate justice reasoning, people are
able to extend the temporal framework of an injustice, such that
any negative outcome previously endured will be ultimately
compensated with a positive outcome. Research has confirmed
that perceiving benefits in the later lives of victims of misfortunes is
one way observers cognitively manage the threat imposed when
observing undeserved suffering [7], [8], [9], [10]. For example,
Anderson and colleagues found that participants, whose belief in a
just world had been previously threatened, displayed a tendency to
see a teenager’s later life as more enjoyable and meaningful if he
had been badly injured than if he suffered only a mild injury [7].
On the other hand, people may try to make sense of suffering
and misfortune by engaging in immanent justice reasoning [11],
[12], [13], for a review see [14], which involves causally attributing
a negative outcome to someone’s prior misdeeds, even if such a
causal connection is illogical. For example, Callan and colleagues
found that participants causally related a freak car accident to a
man’s prior behavior to a greater extent when they learned he
stole from children than when he did not steal [15]. Immanent
justice reasoning, then, allows an observer to maintain a
perception of deservingness by locating the cause of a random
misfortune in the prior misdeeds of the victim [11], [15], [14].
Indeed, research has shown that people engage in greater
immanent justice reasoning when their justice concerns are
heightened by first focusing on their long-term goals [15], cf.
[16] or after being exposed to an unrelated instance of injustice
[11].
Although research has shown that people readily engage in
immanent and ultimate justice reasoning in response to suffering
and misfortune, much less is known about how these responses
interact and how they operate. Indeed, only a handful of studies
have thus far examined ultimate and immanent justice reasoning
simultaneously [17], [18], [19], and have primarily done so in the
context of assessing individual differences in these justice beliefs.
Understanding how these different reactions to misfortune operate
not only informs future theorizing see [1], but also carries practical
implications in predicting how people will react to victims in
different circumstances. Thus, we sought to extend the literature
on immanent and ultimate justice reasoning in three important
ways: (1) by investigating whether there is a relation between
immanent and ultimate justice reasoning, (2) by identifying the
underlying processes that give rise to this relation, and (3) by
examining whether immanent and ultimate justice reasoning
operate the same way when people consider their own misfortune
as when they consider the misfortunes of others (Study 2).
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The relation between immanent and ultimate justice
reasoning
Maes and colleagues [18], [19] identified that people’s
individual endorsement of immanent and ultimate justice reason-
ing resulted in opposite reactions to victims. That is, people who
believe strongly in ultimate justice reasoning are more likely to
positively evaluate victims of misfortune, whereas people scoring
highly in immanent justice beliefs blamed and derogated a victim
for their plight. As immanent and ultimate justice reasoning are
associated with conflicting victim reactions, these reactions to
injustice may have a negative relation, such that the adoption of
one form of justice reasoning reduces the extent to which people
engage in the other. In Study 1, we sought to test this negative
relation between these two types of justice reasoning empirically by
assessing how people make sense out of misfortunes. We predicted
that when people are given to ultimate justice reasoning (i.e., when
the victim is a good person; see [7]), they would be less likely to
engage in immanent justice reasoning. When people are given to
immanent justice reasoning (i.e., when the victim is a bad person;
see [14]), however, they would be less likely to perceive ultimate
justice. We propose that the relation between the worth of the
victim and justice reasoning is at least partly due to people’s
perceptions of what is considered as deserved.
Perceived deservingness and immanent and ultimate
justice reasoning
Responding to instances of suffering and misfortune with
ultimate and immanent justice reasoning can be considered
seemingly irrational. Although there may be logical reasons why
good and bad people will have good or bad lives (e.g., higher well-
being from a good person acting prosocially), often no substantial
causal links exist between a person’s character, their random
misfortune, and their ultimate fulfillment in life; or a victim’s
previous misdeeds and their current misfortune. That is, the worth
of a person does not cause random, unrelated misfortunes and
enduring a random misfortune does not necessarily mean that an
individual’s later life will be better. Despite this seeming
irrationality, people might nonetheless engage in immanent and
ultimate justice reasoning in response to suffering and misfortune
because doing so enables them to maintain important, functional
beliefs. We examined whether immanent and ultimate justice
reasoning might be driven, in part, by the belief that the world is a
just, fair, and nonrandom place where people get what they
deserve—a world where an appropriate relation exists between the
value of people (good or bad) and the value of their outcomes
(good or bad) [20], [3], see also [21]. In other words, both the
processes of causally linking a random misfortune to someone’s
prior misdeeds (immanent justice) and perceiving benefits in the
later lives of victims of misfortune (ultimate justice) might be
driven, in part, by a concern for upholding notions of deserving-
ness.
Deservingness refers to the perceived congruence between the
value of a person and the value of his or her outcomes. Therefore,
something bad happening to a ‘‘good’’ person is often perceived as
undeserved, whereas the same outcome occurring to a ‘‘bad’’
person is often considered deserved [11], [22], [21], [23], [24].
Several studies have confirmed that the perceived deservingness of
a random outcome is an important mediator of the extent to which
people are willing to adopt immanent justice accounts of the
outcome see [14]. Less is known, however, about the processes
underlying ultimate justice reasoning. If the proposed negative
relation between immanent and ultimate justice reasoning is
driven by the ultimate goal of perceiving people’s fates as deserved
in a just world, we predict that perceived deservingness should
underlie the endorsement of both types of justice reasoning.
This analysis is consistent with Kruglanski’s discussion of the
principle of equifinality [25], which suggests that different
substitutable and equal means are capable of reaching the same
goal. In the context of the current research, immanent and
ultimate justice reasoning can both be considered equal means to
achieving the goal of preserving a belief that the world is a fair and
just place where people get what they deserve. People can
accomplish this goal via immanent justice reasoning by attributing
the cause of a misfortune to the victim’s prior misdeeds.
Alternatively, people who engage in ultimate justice reasoning
can uphold their just-world beliefs by believing that a victim’s
misfortune will be ultimately compensated [7]. If participants
engage in one type of reasoning because of their concerns about
deservingness, utilizing an additional type of reasoning would be
redundant. For example, linking an individual’s current misfor-
tune to their prior misdeeds satisfies a concern for deservingness
because the victim ‘‘got what she deserved’’. Further rationaliza-
tions of misfortune, such as believing the victim will be ultimately
compensated, are therefore less necessary and support our
prediction of a negative correlation between ultimate and
immanent justice reasoning.
The extent to which perceived deservingness underlies imma-
nent and ultimate justice reasoning, however, should depend on
the specific outcome people believe is deserved. With immanent
justice reasoning, causal connections are drawn between people’s
previous deeds and their recently experienced outcomes, whereas
ultimate justice reasoning entails believing in more ‘‘long-term’’
positive outcomes for a victim who is suffering. Thus, whether a
concern for deservingness helps explain immanent and ultimate
justice reasoning should depend on what people perceive as
deserved—later life fulfillment or a recently experienced random
outcome—given the value of the person experiencing the
outcome. The idea that specific perceptions of deservingness
might differentially predict immanent and ultimate justice
reasoning resonates well with research showing greater congruen-
cy between constructs that are measured at the same level of
specificity (e.g., values and behavior) [26]. Accordingly, we
examined the degree to which perceptions of deserving later-life
fulfillment and a recently experienced outcome underlie ultimate
and immanent justice reasoning, respectively. We predicted that
perceiving a misfortune as deserved should better predict
immanent justice reasoning [14], whereas perceiving a victim as
deserving of later fulfillment should better predict ultimate justice
reasoning.
Immanent and ultimate justice reasoning for the self
Lerner argued that principles of justice and deservingness for
others should be equivalent to the self, as observing deservingness
in another’s life should mean, by generalization, that one’s own life
is just and fair [3], [27]. Early work by Lerner and colleagues [28],
[29] showed that people are more likely to work towards fairness
for others when they themselves have received unfair treatment,
suggesting that people are responsive to the fates of others because
this determines the fairness of the world they live in. As a result,
one’s own fate ‘‘is intertwined emotionally and practically with the
ability of others to get what they deserve’’ [28] (p. 177).
Consistent with this view, observer judgments of deservingness
are often comparable to deservingness judgments made for the
self. That is, research has shown that people judge others, and
themselves, as deserving bad (good) outcomes if they are perceived
as bad (good) people [11], [22], [30], [23], [24], [31], [32]. For
example, Wood and colleagues found that individuals chronically
The Relation between Judgments of Immanent and Ultimate Justice
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and situationally lower (vs. higher) in self-esteem saw themselves as
more deserving of negative emotions [31]. More recently, Callan
and colleagues found that participants’ beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes in life mediated the relation between trait self-esteem
and a variety of self-defeating thoughts and behaviors (e.g., self-
handicapping, thoughts of self-harm) [22]. Although this research
highlights the important role that perceptions of deservingness for
the self play in a host of self-relevant outcomes, no research to our
knowledge has examined the role that personal deservingness plays
in people’s immanent justice and ultimate justice reasoning for
self-relevant outcomes. To this end, in Study 2 we examined
whether people would causally attribute their random bad breaks
to their personal worth or believe they would achieve a fulfilling
life as a function of their self-esteem and perceptions of
deservingness. In other words, we examined whether the same
relation between immanent and ultimate justice reasoning, and the
same underlying processes of deservingness, in response to the
misfortune of others (Study 1) would replicate when individuals
considered their own misfortune (Study 2).
Current research
Over two sets of studies we sought to investigate whether (1)
there is a negative relation between immanent and ultimate justice
reasoning, (2) perceived deservingness underlies this relation, and
(3) the relation and processes involved in immanent and ultimate
justice reasoning are similar for one’s own misfortunes as they are
for the misfortunes of others. To accomplish these aims we
manipulated the worth of a victim (Study 1) or measured people’s
perceived self-worth (Study 2) before assessing judgments of
deservingness and ultimate and immanent justice reasoning.
If there is a negative relation between immanent and ultimate
justice reasoning in response to misfortune, then people should
engage in significantly more ultimate than immanent justice
reasoning for a victim who is a good person and significantly more
immanent than ultimate justice reasoning for a victim who is a bad
person. We also predicted that specific perceptions of deserving-
ness would underlie this relation, such that perceiving a victim as
deserving of their misfortune would more strongly mediate
immanent justice reasoning and perceiving a victim as deserving
of a fulfilling later life would more strongly mediate ultimate justice
reasoning. Finally, we predicted that this pattern of findings should
be similar when participants consider their own misfortunes (Study
2).
Study 1
In Study 1 we manipulated the value of a victim of misfortune
before assessing participants’ perceptions of the degree to which he
deserved his misfortune and deserved ultimate compensation
along with immanent and ultimate justice reasoning. We predicted
that a ‘‘good’’ victim would encourage participants to engage in
more ultimate than immanent justice reasoning, largely due to the
victim being deserving of ultimate compensation following their ill
fate. When faced with a ‘‘bad’’ victim, however, we predicted that
participants would interpret the victim’s fate as deserved and
therefore engage in more immanent rather than ultimate justice
reasoning.
Method
Participants. The study was administrated online and
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Essex.
Consent was achieved by asking participants to click a button to
begin the study and give their consent or to close their browser and
withdraw consent. We recruited two samples of participants
(Ns=168 and 100; total N=268, 48.9% females, 0.4% unreport-
ed; Mage = 35.35, SDage = 11.88) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
[33] and CrowdFlower. Twelve participants (4.5%) who incor-
rectly answered a simple manipulation question (‘‘Is Keith
Murdoch awaiting trial for sexually assaulting a minor?’’) were
excluded from further analysis. The samples differed only in the
ordering of the items (see procedure below).
Materials and procedure. Participants were told they
would be partaking in a study ‘‘investigating memory and
impressions of events’’. Participants were first presented with an
ostensibly real news article that described a freak accident where a
volunteer swim coach, Keith Murdoch, was seriously injured
following a tree collapsing on his vehicle during high winds see
[15]. Next, we manipulated the worth of the victim by telling
participants that the victim was either a pedophile (‘‘bad’’ person)
or a respected swim coach (‘‘good’’ person). Specifically, partic-
ipants in the ‘‘bad’’ person condition learned that ‘‘Keith
Murdoch is awaiting trial for sexually assaulting a 14-year-old
boy while he worked at the Bitterne Leisure Center as a volunteer
swim coach and that other charges of sexual exploitation of minors
are pending given recent evidence obtained by police since the
original charge.’’ Participants in the ‘‘good’’ person condition read
that ‘‘Keith Murdoch volunteered as a swimming coach at the
Bitterne Leisure Centre and is a valued and beloved member of
the community.’’ We predicted that this information about the
victim’s character should determine how deserving the victim was
of his random misfortune and ultimate compensation and, as a
result, the extent of participants’ immanent and ultimate justice
reasoning respectively.
As a manipulation check, participants rated the goodness of the
victim’s character with the item, ‘‘How would you rate Keith
Murdoch as a person?’’ (1 = very bad to 6 = very good).
Ordering of items for Sample 1. In our first sample, participants
were then asked two questions to assess their perceptions of
deservingness of the accident: ‘‘To what extent do you feel Keith
Murdoch deserved to be in this accident?’’ (1 = not at all deserving
to 6 = very deserving) and ‘‘To what extent do you feel that this
accident was a just and fair outcome for Keith Murdoch?’’ (1 =
not at all just and fair to 6= very just and fair).
Adapted from items used to measure beliefs in conspiracy
theories [34], participants then answered four items that assessed
their immanent justice attributions for the accident: ‘‘To what
extent do you feel it is worth considering that this accident might
have been a result of Keith Murdoch’s conduct as a swim coach?’’
(1 = not at all worth considering to 6 = worth considering), ‘‘How
possible do you feel it is that this accident was a result of Keith
Murdoch’s conduct as a swim coach?’’ (1 = not at all possible to
6= possible), ‘‘How plausible do you feel it is that this accident
was caused by Keith Murdoch’s conduct as a swim coach?’’ (1 =
not at all plausible to 6 = plausible), and ‘‘I feel that this accident
was a result of Keith Murdoch’s conduct as a swim coach.’’ (1 =
strongly disagree to 6= strongly agree).
Following this, participants were asked two items to assess
perceptions of how deserving the victim was of ultimate
compensation: ‘‘I feel that Keith Murdoch deserves to experience
his life as meaningful in the long run’’ and ‘‘I believe Keith
Murdoch deserves to find purpose and fulfillment later in his life’’
(1 = strongly disagree to 6= strongly agree). Finally, three items
assessed ultimate justice reasoning see [7]: ‘‘To what extent do you
think Keith Murdoch will find his existence fulfilling later in his
life?’’, ‘‘To what extent do you believe that in the future, Keith
Murdoch will experience his life as meaningful?’’, and ‘‘To what
extent do you think that in the long run, Keith Murdoch will find
purpose in his life?’’ (1 = not at all fulfilling/meaningful/
The Relation between Judgments of Immanent and Ultimate Justice
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purposeful to 6= very fulfilling/meaningful/purposeful). All items
within each construct reached acceptable internal consistency (see
Table 1), so were averaged to form measures of perceived
deservingness of an accident, immanent justice attributions,
perceived deservingness of ultimate compensation, and ultimate
justice judgments.
Ordering of items for Sample 2. Because we were concerned that
the fixed ordering of our items in Sample 1 may have biased
participants toward the first opportunity they were given to resolve
the injustice (i.e., immanent justice reasoning), we recruited
another sample of participants and reversed the ordering of items
from Sample 1. Sample 2, therefore, was identical to Sample 1,
with the exception of the ordering of items. The questionnaire was
structured so that after rating the goodness of the victim’s
character, participants answered the items regarding how deserv-
ing the victim was of ultimate compensation and deserving of the
accident, followed by the ultimate justice reasoning items and
finally the immanent justice reasoning items.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses showed that there were no significant
differences between the two samples in terms of the effect of the
experimental manipulation on our dependent measures or the
correlations among the measures (i.e., there were no significant
interactions with sample/item order, all ps..05), and the same
patterns of results replicated across samples. Thus, the ordering of
items did not appear to affect participants’ responses. Accordingly,
data from the two samples were collated and analyzed together.
Analysis of the manipulation check confirmed that participants
who learned that the victim was a pedophile (M=1.64, SD=0.76)
perceived him as less good than participants who learned that he
was a respected volunteer (M=5.14, SD=0.57), t(251) = 41.66,
p,.001, d=5.22). Shown in Table 1, participants who were
presented with a ‘‘bad’’ victim rated him as more deserving of his
random bad outcome than participants who read about a ‘‘good’’
victim, conceptually replicating previous research [11], [35]. Also,
participants who were presented with a ‘‘good’’ victim saw him as
more deserving of later fulfillment than a ‘‘bad’’ victim. Table 1
also shows the correlations among the measures we employed in
Study 1. Of note, both types of perceived deservingness correlated
significantly with both types of justice judgments, and immanent
and ultimate justice reasoning correlated negatively.
The interplay between immanent and ultimate justice
reasoning. To examine the interplay between immanent and
ultimate justice reasoning as a function of the value of the victim,
we conducted a 2 (victim worth: good vs. bad) by 2 (type of justice
reasoning: immanent justice vs. ultimate justice) mixed model
ANOVA, with type of justice reasoning as the within-subjects
factor. Because people are typically more willing to endorse
ultimate justice than immanent justice in absolute terms, we
standardized the data for comparisons across types of justice
reasoning (the unstandardized data is presented in Table 1).
Analyses revealed the predicted Victim Worth X Type of
Reasoning interaction, F(1, 254) = 176.09, p,.001, gp
2 = .41.
Shown in Figure 1, decomposing the interaction revealed that
participants engaged in relatively more immanent justice than
ultimate justice reasoning when the victim was a pedophile,
t(124) = 7.96, p,.001, and more ultimate justice than immanent
justice reasoning when he was a respected volunteer,
t(130) = 12.01, p,.001.
Perceived Deservingness. We examined whether the per-
ceived deservingness of the victim’s fate accounts for the observed
relation between participants’ judgments of immanent justice and
ultimate justice. That is, a concern for deservingness should
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underpin the degree to which people engage in more or less
immanent justice reasoning relative to ultimate justice reasoning as
a function of the worth of the victim. More specifically, perceiving
a victim as deserving of his fate should better underlie immanent
justice judgments and perceiving a victim as deserving of later life
fulfillment should better predict ultimate justice reasoning, as a
function of the victim’s worth.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted multiple mediation
analyses with Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) bootstrapping proce-
dure (10,000 resamples; see Figure 2) [36]. As predicted,
bootstrapping analyses revealed that perceived deservingness of
the accident mediated the effect of the victim’s worth on
immanent justice reasoning (indirect effect =20.81, BCa
CI=21.13 to 20.56), but perceived deservingness of later
fulfillment did not (indirect effect = 0.06, BCa CI =20.19 to
0.31). The same analysis conducted with ultimate justice reasoning
showed both types of deservingness mediated the effect of the
victim’s worth on justice reasoning, but perceived deservingness of
later fulfillment (indirect effect = .88, BCa CI= 0.63 to 1.15) was a
stronger mediator than perceived deservingness of the accident
(indirect effect = .23, BCa CI = .06 to 0.45). The same mediation
pattern was observed for both samples separately. The exception
being that for the second sample, perceived deservingness of the
accident did not mediate the effect of the manipulation on ultimate
justice reasoning (cf. Study 2; indirect effect =20.02, BCa CI=2
0.24 to 0.25). In sum, the value of a victim affects whether people
view the misfortune or later life fulfillment as deserved, which in
turn predicts the extent of immanent justice reasoning over
ultimate justice reasoning and vice versa.
Study 2
In Study 2, we sought to conceptually replicate our Study 1
findings in the context of participants’ considerations of their own
misfortunes. Study 1 found that participants perceived greater
immanent justice for a victim with negative (vs. positive) worth and
greater ultimate justice reasoning for a victim of positive (vs.
negative) worth. In Study 2, we predicted that people’s perceived
self-worth should similarly influence the extent of justice reasoning
for their own outcomes. Specifically, we assessed whether people
are more likely to engage in immanent or ultimate justice
reasoning for the self after considering their own misfortunes as
a function of their perceptions of personal deservingness. To test
this notion, we measured participants’ self-esteem before asking
them to respond to deservingness, immanent, and ultimate justice
items in relation to their own recent bad breaks. Paralleling our
Study 1 effects, we predicted that self-esteem would correlate
negatively with immanent justice reasoning and positively with
ultimate justice reasoning. Crucially, we predicted that perceived
deservingness would underlie the relations between self-esteem
and justice reasoning for the self. Per our Study 1 findings, we
predicted that perceiving a bad break as deserved would better
predict immanent justice reasoning for the self and perceiving
oneself as deserving of later life fulfillment should be a better
predictor of ultimate justice judgments for the self.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited online via Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk for a nominal payment (N=102) or the
University of Essex volunteer e-mail list for the chance to win a
£20 gift voucher (N=100; total N=202, 56.9% females;
Mage = 27.64, SDage = 9.58). One participant was excluded from
further analysis because he/she only answered one item from the
self-esteem measure. Ethical approval and informed consent was
obtained in the same way as Study 1.
Materials and procedure. Participants took part in a study
that was ostensibly about ‘‘people’s perceptions of their personal
experiences.’’ We first assessed participant’s self-esteem via Rosen-
berg’s 10-item self-esteem scale (1= strongly disagree to 6= strongly
agree) [37]. We then asked participants to think about their recent
Figure 1. Mean level of immanent justice and ultimate justice
reasoning from Study 1 (standardized) as a function of the
victim’s personal worth (pedophile versus respected volun-
teer). Error bars show standard errors of the means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0101803.g001
Figure 2. Mediational model from Study 1, predicting imma-
nent justice and ultimate justice reasoning from the worth of a
victim, beliefs about deserving bad outcomes, and beliefs
about deserving later fulfillment. The victim of negative worth
(pedophile) was coded as 1 and the victim of positive worth (respected
volunteer) was coded as 2. Values show unstandardized path
coefficients. * p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0101803.g002
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random ‘‘bad breaks.’’ Bad breaks were described to participants as
‘‘those sorts of negative experiences we have that we do not intend,
expect, or plan to occur—they just happen to us.’’
Next, participants answered a questionnaire similar to that of
Study 1, although the questions were framed around participants’
personal random bad breaks and in more general terms, due to the
recalled ‘‘bad breaks’’ being general events rather than a specific
incident of victimization. First, participants answered two items
that aimed to assess their perceived deservingness of general bad
outcomes: ‘‘I often feel that I deserve the bad breaks that happen
to me’’ and ‘‘When I’ve experienced bad breaks in my life, I’ve
sometimes thought that I deserved them’’ (1 = strongly disagree to
6 = strongly agree). Similar items from Study 1 were used to assess
immanent justice reasoning (e.g., ‘‘How possible do you feel it is
that your bad breaks were a result of the kind of person you are?’’).
Next, we presented participants with two items that assessed how
deserving they felt of greater life fulfillment and meaningfulness
(e.g., ‘‘I feel that I deserve to experience my life as meaningful in
the long run’’) and three ultimate justice items based on those from
Study 1 (e.g., ‘‘To what extent do you think you will find your
existence fulfilling later in life?’’). Table 1 shows that each of these
measures achieved acceptable internal consistency.
Results and Discussion
Shown in Table 1, participants’ self-esteem was negatively
related to immanent justice judgments, showing that the lower
their self-esteem, the more participants felt their bad breaks were
caused by the kind of person they were. Self-esteem and ultimate
justice reasoning were positively related, indicating that the higher
participants’ self-esteem, the more they engaged in ultimate justice
reasoning for themselves. These findings replicate our Study 1
results, but do so in the context of participants considering their
own bad breaks rather than the misfortune of someone else.
Indeed, reflecting the interaction pattern shown in Figure 1, a test
of the difference between overlapping correlations [38] showed
that the correlation between self-esteem and immanent justice
reasoning was significantly different from the correlation between
self-esteem and ultimate justice reasoning (95% confidence
interval: 21.16, 2.85).
Of particular importance was the mediating role of deserving-
ness beliefs in these relations, which we specified into two forms:
(1) the deservingness of past bad breaks and (2) the deservingness
of later life fulfillment. We again conducted multiple mediation
analyses with Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) bootstrapping proce-
dure (10,000 resamples) [36]. When entering both deservingness of
bad breaks and deservingness of later fulfillment as possible
mediators of the relation between self-esteem and immanent
justice reasoning, only the former provided a significant indirect
effect. In other words, perceived deservingness of bad breaks
significantly mediated the relation between self-esteem and
immanent justice reasoning (indirect effect =20.27, BCa
CI=20.41 to 20.14) but perceived deservingness of later
fulfillment did not (indirect effect = 0.03, BCa CI=20.04 to
0.08). Conducting the same analysis for ultimate justice reasoning
revealed that perceived deservingness of bad breaks did not
mediate the relation between self-esteem and ultimate justice
reasoning (indirect effect = 0.003, BCa CI =20.05 to 0.06) but
perceived deservingness of later life fulfillment did (indirect effect
= 0.09, BCa CI= 0.03 to 0.19).
Therefore, only deservingness of bad breaks mediated the
relation between self-esteem and immanent justice reasoning,
whereas only deservingness of later life fulfillment mediated the
relation between self-esteem and ultimate justice reasoning for the
self (see Figure 3).
General Discussion
Over two studies we sought to determine (1) the relation
between immanent justice and ultimate justice reasoning, (2) the
underlying mechanism responsible for this relation, and (3) if the
relation between immanent and ultimate justice reasoning not only
applies to the misfortunes of others, but also to one’s own
misfortunes. Study 1 showed that participants engaged in
immanent justice reasoning to a greater extent when they learned
that a victim was a ‘‘bad’’ (vs. ‘‘good’’) person, whereas they
perceived more ultimate justice reasoning when the victim was a
‘‘good’’ (vs. ‘‘bad’’) person. When people are given to making
immanent justice attributions (i.e., when a victim is of low worth),
ultimate justice judgments are lower. However, when individuals
are prone to ultimate justice reasoning (i.e., when a victim is of
high worth), immanent justice reasoning is reduced.
Importantly, perceived deservingness mediated these effects.
When confronted with a ‘‘good’’ person who experienced a
random ill-fate, participants saw the victim as deserving of later life
fulfillment and therefore, rejected an immanent justice account of
the event in favor of perceiving benefits in the later life of the
victim. When the victim was considered in negative terms,
however, participants were more willing to see the misfortune as
deserved and causally attribute the freak accident to the victim’s
past behavior, as well as reducing their ultimate justice judgments
accordingly. As a result, participants engaged in immanent and
ultimate justice reasoning as a function of their concerns for
deservingness. The type of perceived deservingness that best
predicted the extent of justice reasoning was that which was the
Figure 3. Mediational model from Study 2, predicting imma-
nent justice and ultimate justice reasoning from self-esteem,
beliefs about deserving bad outcomes, and beliefs about
deserving later fulfillment. Values show unstandardized path
coefficients. * p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0101803.g003
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most compatible on specificity. In other words, perceived
deservingness of the current misfortune was more specific to
immanent justice reasoning and proved to be the strongest
predictor. However, perceptions of deservingness in later life
outcomes was more congruent with ultimate justice reasoning and
therefore best predicted people’s ultimate justice judgments.
Study 2 extended these findings into the domain of considering
one’s own bad breaks and future fulfillment in life. After thinking
about their own bad breaks, ultimate justice reasoning for the self
was greater among participants higher in self-esteem, whereas
immanent justice reasoning was more pronounced among
participants lower in self-esteem. Study 2 also mirrored Study
19s effects of deservingness as underling these reactions to one’s
own outcomes. The perceived deservingness of bad breaks
mediated the negative relation between self-esteem and immanent
justice attributions, whereas only perceived deservingness of future
life fulfillment mediated the positive relation between self-esteem
and ultimate justice reasoning for the self.
These findings contribute to the literature in two important and
novel ways: First, we examined how people try to make sense out
of the misfortunes of others by engaging in both immanent and
ultimate justice reasoning at once. We showed that these two types
of justice reasoning are negatively related to one another and
perceived deservingness plays an important role in the interplay
between immanent and ultimate justice reasoning in response to
the misfortunes of others. These findings therefore contribute to
the limited literature examining when, and for whom, different
reactions to instances of misfortune are apparent [1], [9], [17],
[39], [40], [10]. As Hafer and Be`gue argued, no one response is
dominant across situations or individuals, and therefore multiple
reactions should be assessed to gain a more comprehensive
knowledge of how people make sense out of and find meaning in
suffering and misfortune [1], also see [41]. Our work takes one
step in that direction by suggesting the worth of a victim is key to
determining perceptions of deservingness, which in turn influences
the extent of both immanent and ultimate justice reasoning.
Of course, responding in terms of immanent and ultimate
justice are by no means the only ways people make sense of
misfortune and suffering. Interestingly, our manipulation of victim
worth in Study 1 could be considered a manipulation of ‘‘just-
world’’ threat, presumably because the ‘‘good’’ victim poses a
larger threat to participants’ just-world beliefs than the ‘‘bad’’
victim. Research has shown that people perceive the suffering of
‘‘good’’ victims as more unfair than the suffering of ‘‘bad’’ victims
(e.g., when a physically attractive vs. an unattractive person is
harmed) [42], [43], [44], [45]. Therefore, the interplay between
other known responses to just-world threat, such as victim blaming
see [1], and the responses to misfortune we measured here have
yet to be investigated. It is therefore important for future research
to examine perceptions of immanent and ultimate justice alongside
other means by which people might maintain a perception of
justice in the face of threat.
Second, the interactive pattern between the worth of a victim
and type of justice reasoning we observed in Study 1 was
replicated in Study 2 in the context of participants considering
their own misfortunes. Of particular intrigue, we found that
participants lower in self-esteem saw themselves as more deserving
of their negative outcomes and were willing to adopt immanent
justice attributions for their own fortuitous bad breaks. Although
research into immanent justice reasoning has almost exclusively
focused on people’s causal attributions for the random misfortunes
occurring to others [14], we found that the same processes operate
when people entertain the causes of their own random bad breaks,
and personal deservingness plays a crucial mediating role in this
relation. In addition, we found that participants with higher self-
esteem believed they were more deserving of, and would therefore
receive, a fulfilling and meaningful life. These findings add to the
existing literature on how people make sense of their misfortunes
[46] by suggesting that perceived deservingness of ultimate
compensation plays an important meditational role.
Further, our findings may be important and applicable to our
understanding of people’s coping and resilience in the face of
personal suffering and misfortune. Some research has shown that
sufferers of illnesses engage in thought processes akin to ultimate
and immanent justice reasoning, and these types of reasoning can
be either beneficial or detrimental to their health [47], [48], [49],
[50]. Our findings suggest that deservingness—either in the form
of deserving one’s recent bad breaks or deserving fulfillment later
in life—might be underlying these types of responses to misfortune
and as a result, may determine the trajectory of patient’s well-
being and recovery. For example, believing that one contracted an
illness because they were a bad person deserving of bad outcomes
may lead to heightened anxiety, lower levels of life-satisfaction,
and a reduced likelihood of recovery cf. [48]. In a similar vein,
Callan and colleagues found that individuals who held stronger
beliefs that they deserved bad outcomes engaged in more self-
defeating behaviors, including self-handicapping, wanting close
others to evaluate them negatively, and seeking negative feedback
about their performance during an intelligence test [22]. On the
other hand, adopting the belief that one deserves a fulfilling and
meaningful life in the future may lead to greater general well-being
in the face of illness cf. [47]. Of course, more research is needed on
the role that these deservingness beliefs might play in people’s
responses to their own misfortunes, but our work offers a
theoretical perspective and empirical findings that point to their
potential importance.
Finally, the present research encourages related lines of future
research. We considered immanent and ultimate justice as
reactions to undeserved negative outcomes, but both of these
types of justice reasoning might also be adopted when people make
sense of undeserved positive outcomes e.g., [11]. Therefore, it is
important for future research to extend these findings in the
context of positive outcomes. Although some research has
examined the effects of undeserved positive outcomes on
immanent justice reasoning (e.g., a man won the lottery because
he was pleasant and hard working) [11], to our knowledge no
research has considered ultimate justice reasoning in response to
undeserved positive outcomes. We speculate that observing a good
person experiencing a good outcome should result in individuals
perceiving the two as causally connected (i.e., immanent justice
reasoning) cf. [11], but observing the same outcome occurring to a
bad person should encourage individuals to believe that the lucky
individual will receive their comeuppance in the future (i.e.,
ultimate justice reasoning). Although much of just-world research
has been concerned with victims of misfortune see [1], Lerner
suggested that any injustice, good or bad, threatens our
commitment to a just world [27]. Therefore, to further our
understanding of how responses to misfortune operate, it is
important for future research to consider both sides of the coin—
people’s responses to undeserved positive outcomes as a well as
undeserved negative outcomes.
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